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Ending African Hunger
Six Challenges for Scientists, 
Policymakers and Politicians
Carl K. Eicher 
Michigan State University
Nineteen-sixty is usually referred to as the beginning of Africa's in 
dependence movement because 16 African colonies won their in 
dependence in that year. Over the 1960 to 1985 period, however, at 
least 40 of the 45 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa wasted a generation 
in failing to develop their agriculture as an engine of growth of their 
national economies. After several decades of independence, Africa is 
still the poorest part of the world's economy and seven of every ten 
Africans live in rural areas. The dreams of African leaders of skipping 
stages of development and catching up with the rich countries in one 
or two generations have all but vanished, as despair, frustration and 
disappointment have become the code words in African political circles.
When African countries started to reclaim their independence in the 
1960s, Sub-Saharan Africa was a modest net exporter of food—mostly 
groundnuts (peanuts) and palm oil to Europe. But Africa slowly lost 
its capacity to feed itself during the sixties. The situation deteriorated 
further in the seventies with the drought and famine in the Sahelian region 
of West Africa. During the 15-year period from 1970 to 1984, Africa's 
population grew at twice the rate of growth of food production. In 1985, 
25 years after independence, 22 African states appealed to the interna 
tional community for emergency food aid and 300,000 people died in 
the Great Ethiopian Famine.
In Africa's first 25 years of independence, only four or five of the 
forty-five countries in Sub-Saharan Africa gave priority to agriculture 
and to feeding their people. The remaining countries paid lip service
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to agriculture while emphasizing industrialization, state control and the 
taxation of agriculture. In this essay, I shall look back 25 years and 
examine why Africa wasted a generation in developing its agricultural 
base. I shall then look ahead and examine what can be done to end hunger 
in Africa over the next 25 years. I have taken the long view, i.e., the 
long pull—because there is little that can be done over the next five 
to ten years to slow population growth and end hunger in Africa.
Hunger can be defined as the inability of households to produce, pur 
chase or acquire a calorie-adequate diet throughout the year. I shall 
focus on calories rather than protein because recent research has shown 
that, with the exception of pregnant women and nursing mothers, the 
protein needs of most people can be met if enough calories are con 
sumed from multiple sources.
Although there are currently more hungry people in Asia than in Africa 
because of the sheer size of Asia's population relative to Africa, the 
most challenging and intractable problems of hunger and famine are 
in Sub-Saharan Africa: an immense land area of 45 countries, 7 col 
onial histories, and more than 1,000 different ethnic groups. 1 Moreover, 
most Asian countries have made enormous progress over the past few 
decades in controlling famine before it becomes a local or national 
disaster. For example, the last major famine in Asia occurred in 
Bangladesh in 1974 when 1.5 million people perished. In Africa, 
however, famine has not been brought under control. Famine in the 
Sahelian zone of West Africa in the early 1970s was followed by the 
Great African Famine in Ethiopia and Somalia of 1985.
Since Africa is an integral part of the international food equation, 
I shall examine the goal to end hunger in Africa in an international con 
text, including the use of donor assistance and food aid in increasing 
food production and access to food. The hallmark of the world food 
equation of the late 1980s is underproduction of food in many African 
countries, overproduction in industrial nations such as the United States, 
Canada, Europe, Japan and Australia, and emerging overproduction 
of food in some Third World nations such as Brazil and India. For ex 
ample, India recently joined the ranks of food aid donors when it 
delivered 100,000 tons of food aid to Africa in 1985. India plans to
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donate 35,000 tons of grain to Africa in 1987. Although India's achieve 
ment of food self-sufficiency and its generosity to Africa are to be ad 
mired, it should be pointed out that roughly 200 million or one-fourth 
of India's population are hungry and unable to acquire a calorie-adequate 
diet. The hungry in India are the landless, jobless, poor, and the destitute 
who are unable to produce, purchase or acquire enough calories to lead 
a normal life. Under these circumstances, why should India ship food 
aid to Africa except to gain political capital? Th lesson that emerges 
from India's experience for Africa is that the expansion of food pro 
duction and the achievement of national food self-sufficiency will not 
automatically end hunger.
It is important to debate African hunger in the United States because 
there is a great deal of misinformation and facile slogans being peddl 
ed on the need for Africans to produce more food and fewer cash crops, 
the belief that hunger can be ended simply by increasing food produc 
tion and the belief in some circles that hunger in Africa is caused by 
multinational firms and international capitalism.
I have chosen to discuss six challenges for ending hunger in Africa:
1. The challenge of learning why the first generation of African 
political leaders, policymakers, and their foreign advisors under 
valued agriculture and food production over the 1960-84 period,
2. The challenge of slowing rapid population growth,
3. The human capital challenge,
4. The challenge of focusing on the prime movers of increasing food 
and agricultural production,
5. The challenge of reducing poverty and increasing access to food,
6. The challenge of reordering foreign aid priorities.
The Challenge of Learning from the Mistakes 
of the First Generation of African Leaders 
and Their Foreign Advisors: 1960 to 1985
Two essential questions must be addressed in an analysis of the poor 
performance of agriculture in the postindependence period. First, what
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role did African states assign to agriculture and the industrial sectors 
in national development strategies in the 1960s and 1970s? Second, what 
strategies were used by African states to increase food and agricultural 
production?
The postindependence experience provides a clear answer to the first 
question. Most western economic advisors to African governments in 
the 1960s promoted industrialization, rural to urban migration, and the 
taxation of agriculture. With the exception of a few countries such as 
the Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Rwanda, Kenya and Malawi, African 
political leaders undervalued agriculture and gave priority to industrial 
development at the same time the agriculture sector was usually heavi 
ly taxed to finance industrial projects and the urban symbols of moder 
nization such as a soccer stadium, a new House of Parliament and a 
four-lane highway from the international airport to independence square 
in the capital city.
In the 1960s, most African heads of state did not believe in investing 
in the agricultural sector because of the view that industrialization of 
fered the most rapid avenue to change the structure of African economies 
from traditional agrarian/export-dominated economies to modern in 
dustrial economies. But in practice, industrialization has proven to be 
more complex than imagined. Throughout Africa, industrial plants are 
now standing idle because of inefficiency, mismanagement, corruption 
and lack of markets. For example, while visiting Tanzania in October 
of 1985,1 observed that the government-owned shoe factory in Morogoro 
that was financed by a World Bank loan was operating at 4.5 percent 
of capacity. I also observed that the cashew nut processing plants were 
standing idle because it was cheaper to ship raw cashew nuts to India 
for hand shelling because the unskilled wage in India was substantially 
lower than in Tanzania.
Why did most African heads of state impose such heavy taxes on 
agriculture for financing large-scale industrial projects? There is con 
sistent evidence that African heads of state in anglophone and fran 
cophone states associated poverty and underdevelopment with colonial 
strategies of producing agricultural exports—sisal, cocoa, oil palm, rub 
ber and coffee—for European markets. Whether the head of state was
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espousing capitalism or socialism, there was a view that continued in 
vestment in export crops for overseas markets would be risky and would 
continue Africa's dependence on western markets. This point of view 
is reflected in the late Walter Rodney's immensely popular book in 
African universities—How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (1974).
Houphet-Boigny—the President of the Ivory Coast and Hastings Ban- 
da, Life President of Malawi, are shining examples of veteran politi 
cians who promoted agricultural development over the past 25 years. 
Blessed with a rich natural resource base, adequate rainfall and an open- 
door policy to immigrants from neighboring countries, today the Ivory 
Coast is a middle-income nation with a per capita income several times 
higher than that of Ghana even though Ghana was by far the richest 
country in West Africa at independence in 1958. Malawi, a landlocked 
country with a poor natural resource base, is not only self-sufficient 
in maize, the staple food, but it has exported maize for seven of the 
past ten years.
Over the past three to five years there has been a growing awareness 
among new African leaders such as Prime Minister Robert Mugabe of 
Zimbabwe, President Diouf of Senegal, and President Mwinyi of Tan 
zania, that an agriculture-led development strategy should be pursued 
in economies where 70 to 90 percent of the people live in rural areas 
and petroleum and minerals are not available to generate adequate foreign 
exchange. However, because of the diversity of Africa's natural resource 
base and opportunities for development, there is no single agricultural 
development model that can be advocated for Africa. The relative em 
phasis that a national development strategy gives to industry, mining 
and/or agriculture must be sorted out on a country-to-country basis. 
But we can conclude after 25 years of independence that most African 
states are starting to give greater priority to investment in agriculture 
and less to industry than they did five to ten years ago.
The second question—how to develop agriculture—was answered in 
most African states in the 1960s by narrow assumptions about African 
farmers and herders and a belief in the ease of importing agricultural 
technology and models of production (e.g., large-scale farms and 
ranches) from industrial countries. In Africa, in the 1960s—as in Asia and
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Latin America in the 1950s—farmers and livestock owners were assumed 
to be irrational, inefficient and bound to a culture of tradition and poverty. 
It was also assumed by many African leaders and their foreign advisors 
that large-scale farms, plantations and ranches were more efficient than 
small farms. Throughout most of the 1960s and 1970s, African govern 
ments, donors and foreign advisors assumed that food crop technology 
was ' 'on the shelf' or that it could be imported from temperate climates 
in Europe and North America. It was further assumed that the adop 
tion of improved technology could be speeded up by increasing the 
number of extension agents to "educate" farmers on the need to spend 
less time on feasts, festivals and sorghum beer parties and more time 
on increasing food production. Many African governments followed 
this advice and from 1959 to 1980, the 45 countries in Africa hired 
an additional 50,000 extension agents under the mistaken assumption 
that extension agents, rather than technical packages, 2 were the miss 
ing link in developing African agriculture.
With few exceptions, the first generation of African leaders, whether 
they were the leaders of civilian, military, radical or conservative 
regimes—were consistent in giving priority to industrial/urban develop 
ment, exploiting farmers and rural people by imposing harsh taxes on 
export crops and giving rural people little voice in setting national 
agriculture policies and development priorities. The first generation also 
failed to understand that agricultural development is a slow, evolutionary 
and complex process that does not lend itself to rhetoric, ideology or 
to crash food production campaigns. Since most countries wasted a 
generation in developing their agriculture, the challenge for the second 
generation of African leaders is to learn from the mistakes of the past 
in addressing the challenge of developing African agriculture and end 
ing hunger. But the bottom line is that many older African leaders must 
be replaced with a new generation who realize that Africa's poverty 
and underdevelopment is, to a large extent, the result of misguided na 
tional development strategies that gave priority to industrialization rather 
than strengthening the agricultural base as a precondition for industrial 
development.
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The Challenge of Slowing Rapid Population Growth
Africa's 3.2 percent annual rate of population growth is the highest 
in the world. In fact, the total population in the region is estimated to 
increase from 460 million in 1985 to 730 million in year 2000, an in 
crease of almost 300 million in just 15 years. The total fertility rate- 
the average number of children born during a woman's lifetime—is 6.9 
in Africa, the highest in the world. 3
Looking ahead, most population experts are of the opinion that fer 
tility rates will remain high for the next 10 to 20 years because of the 
following reasons:
1. Erosion of the Custom of Abstinence. In many countries, the custom 
of abstaining from sex after a child is born ranges from 40 days 
in some Islamic groups to two years for some ethnic groups in 
Central and West Africa. When abstinence exceeds a year, it is 
usually continued until the child is weaned from the breast. This 
can lead to a spacing as much as four years between children. But 
the custom of abstinence is eroding, thus raising fertility.
2. From Breast to Bottle Feeding. The biological process of breast 
feeding suppresses ovulation up to two years for the most pro 
longed breast feeders. But the aggressive advertising of powdered 
milk and baby formula is leading to a shift from breast to bottle 
feeding, thus contributing to higher fertility rates. 
3 . Slow Adoption of Contraceptives. Knowledge about contraceptives 
is low in Africa. Two-thirds of women in Cameroon have never 
heard of them. Among the women in Kenya exposed to contracep 
tives, only 12 percent use them. Fewer than 5 percent of women 
exposed to contraceptives in Senegal—a Moslem country—use them 
(Bongaarts, Odele and Lesthaeghe 1984).
African attitudes toward rapid population growth are changing, 
however. In 1984, 40 African nations met in Kenya and adopted the 
Kilimanjaro Program of Action for Population that calls for family plan 
ning services to be made available to all couples—either free or at sub 
sidized prices. Zimbabwe has recently become the first African nation 
to achieve a statistically verified reduction in fertility levels. More than 
35 percent of urban women now use contraceptives in Zimbabwe.
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Two demographic lessons emerge from the historical experience of 
the past 25 years. First, African heads of state, donor agencies and scien 
tists have underestimated the acceleration of the annual rate of popula 
tion growth from 2.6 percent in th early 1960s to an Africa average 
of 3.2 percent today. Second, political leaders and population experts 
have underestimated the valid economic reasons why rural families want 
more children and the length of time and resources that would be re 
quired to slow population growth rates. Under conditions of surplus 
land and the lack of a state social security service, children can make 
a positive economic contribution to their families by fetching firewood, 
cutting grass for animals, as well as providing support for their parents 
in their old age.
Western science currently has no proven technology to slow Africa's 
rapid population growth. For Americans obsessed with technological 
fixes, it is difficult to realize that flooding Africa with contraceptives 
is not the answer. The high fertility and population growth rates can 
only be slowed gradually through more improvements in health, 
women's schooling, and the reduction of poverty and infant mortality.
In summary, rapid population growth will exert pressure on the natural 
resource base throughout the continent. Africa's current 3.2 percent 
rate of population growth is roughly triple the rate of growth of popula 
tion in presently industrial countries like Denmark and the Netherlands 
at a comparable stage in their economic history from 1850 to 1900, 
and in Japan from 1878 to 1912. Because of Africa's rapid rate of popula 
tion growth, policies for increasing food production and slowing popula 
tion growth must be conceptualized as long-term efforts because fer 
tility rates are simply not going to plummet over the next five to ten 
years. The agonizing lesson that flows from the historical experience 
since 1960 is that slowing the population growth rate—like increasing 
food production—is a slow, evolutionary, stepwise process.
The Human Capital Challenge
When African nations started to reclaim their independence in the 
early 1960s, illiteracy rates exceeded 90 percent in many countries and
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drop-out rates were high. Moreover, the stock of university graduates 
was exceedingly low—around 100 in Zambia—at independence and the 
enrollment ratio of students enrolled in post-high school and univer 
sities was less than 1 percent. Moreover, Sub-Saharan African coun 
tries had one-fourth the number of skilled manpower per million peo 
ple in 1970 that Asian countries had in 1960.
Looking back over the past 25 years, Africa has made enormous gains 
in education at all levels, especially up to around 1980. For example, 
the number of students enrolled in all levels—primary, secondary and 
post-secondary (includes technical schools and universities), increased 
fivefold over the 1970 to 1983 period. Despite these impressive 
achievements, however, there is growing evidence that 1980 was a turn 
ing point for education in Africa. Although total African expenditure 
on all levels of education grew from $3.8 billion in 1970 to $10.0 billion 
in 1980, total expenditure fell by 11 percent between 1980 and 1983. 
Moreover, the 8.4 percent annual rate of growth of primary schooling 
between 1970 and 1980 fell to 2.9 percent from 1980 to 1983. If the 
rate of primary school enrollment (2.9 percent) does not keep up with 
Africa's population growth of 3.2 percent, Africa's educational base 
will be eroded.
Africa's educational problems have been studied by a World Bank 
task force over the past two years. The core recommendation of the 
task force is to reduce the share of public investment on university- 
level education and to increase expenditures on primary and secondary 
education. This recommendation will be hotly criticized by leaders of 
African universities because they believe that shifting the relative mix 
of resources to primary and secondary schooling will make it difficult 
for Africa to develop its scientific capacity and reduce the number of 
expatriate teachers and researchers.
The development of higher education in Africa should be examined 
in historical perspective. When African nations became independent in 
the early 1960s, they were encouraged to import technology from in 
dustrial countries, to send Africans overseas for agricultural training 
and to rely on tens of thousands of teachers and technical advisors 
(technical assistance) to fill manpower gaps until students returned from
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overseas training. The desire for overseas training was reinforced by 
African leaders such as President Senghor of Senegal, a distinguished 
poet and leader of Senegal from independence in 1960 until he 
volunteered to retire in December 1980. Although Senghor personally 
encouraged Senegalese students to study business administration in the 
United States, one can legitimately pose the question: Why did Presi 
dent Senghor wait until 1979—19 years after independence—to start 
undergraduate training in agriculture in Senegal? This is a puzzle that 
merits closer examination because Senegal is a profoundly agrarian coun 
try with 70 percent of its people engaged in agriculture. The 19-year 
time gap cannot be blamed on French colonial policies. It is a reflec 
tion of the ambivalent attitude that Senghor and most first generation 
African leaders had for developing indigenous scientific capacity in food 
and agriculture.
After 25 years of independence, Africa is still heavily dependent on 
international advisors in most scientific and technical fields. For ex 
ample, in the early 1980s, about $4 billion or half of the annual official 
foreign aid (public) to Africa was used to pay the salaries, and "care 
and feeding" of approximately 80,000 western experts (about 40,000 
school teachers, and 40,000 expatriate advisors, managers, teachers and 
scientists). But the provision of Western (and to a lesser extent Eastern 
Bloc) technical assistance to Africa is coming under heavy attack because 
of its high cost ($100,000 to $150,000 per person per year), its rapid 
turnover, and its uneven quality. Overseas training is also under heavy 
attack because of the growing awareness among Africans that it is a 
stop gap measure for the inevitable decision that will have to be made 
to strengthen Africa's capacity to train its students at home. 
Sending foreign advisors to Africa and training Africans in the United 
States are politically popular to American taxpayers. Both activities con 
tribute to the 75 percent of all American foreign aid that is currently 
returned to the United States in the form of tuition payments, salaries 
paid to American advisors, and income derived from the sale of U.S. 
products—fertilizer, wheat, rice and tractors—for African states. But 
there is a puzzle in the human capital equation that should be critically 
examined. Why did the U.S. government take the long view in India
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in the 1960s when it helped develop 23 new state agricultural univer 
sities and fund their development for the next 15 years? Why is the 
United States taking the short-run view in Africa in the 1980s?
Unfortunately little leadership is coming from Africa on educational 
reform. African universities are notoriously overstaffed, inefficient and 
expensive. For example, in 1980-81, Nigerian universities employed 
52,000 staff (teachers, cooks, guards, servants) for a student popula 
tion of 69,000. By contrast, 8,300 employees care for 67,000 students 
in the 16 public colleges and universities in the state of West Virginia 
in 1987 (New York Times 1987). Since virtually the total cost of a univer 
sity education in Africa is paid for by the government, it is privately 
profitable for African families to send their children to universities. But 
the returns to society for university-level education are low under the 
present cost structure and priorities where students are trained in fields 
such as law, history, geography and political science instead of fields 
dominated by western advisors such as computer science, business ad 
ministration, engineering and plant science.
Africa has inherited an elitist model of higher education from the 
British, French, German and Portuguese. Because of the bleak finan 
cial position of many African countries, higher education is now under 
stress and the quality of education is falling in many universities. A 
few countries are starting to introduce long overdue structural innova 
tions, including the development of new university models that are rele 
vant to the agrarian dominated continent. For example, Tanzania recently 
started a new agricultural university—Sokoine University of 
Agriculture—that is modeled after the Punjab state agricultural univer 
sity in India, a university established in the 1960s with the assistance 
of U.S. foreign aid and technical support from Ohio State University. 
Ethiopia recently launched the Alemaya University of Agriculture at 
AJemaya.
The 25 major foreign aid donors in Africa, including the flagship 
donor—the World Bank—do not have a strategic plan on how to break 
the "iron grip" of fellowships for overseas training and providing 
technical experts to Africa. The time is ripe for a fundamental re- 
examination of human capital strategies in Africa. Most donors have 
retreated from investment in human capital. For example, Uma Lele
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of the World Bank reports that World Bank lending to education in Africa 
declined from 10.6 percent of African allocation in the 1960s, to 7.5 
percent during the 1970s, and 4.1 percent over the 1980-84 period (Lele 
1987, p. 326). In fact, in fiscal year 1984, the World Bank allocated 
only two educational loans to Africa totaling $25 million. The major 
western donors are standing on the sidelines supplying fellowships for 
overseas training and short-term technical assistance while studiously 
avoiding making the long-term commitment of funds and teachers for 
long-term human capital institution building projects that were routinely 
offered to Columbia, Brazil and Argentina in the 1950s and 1960s and 
to India and other Asian nations in the 1960s and 1970s.
In a continent with large amounts of idle land and energetic people, 
what strikes one most about Africa's underdevelopment is the dispropor 
tionate stock of skilled people between Africa and the rich countries 
and between Africa and Latin America and Asia. The challenge now 
is to assess the experience of the first 25 years of independence and 
to lay the groundwork for helping African nations develop new models 
of education that are more cost-effective, relevant and sustainable.
The Challenge of Focusing Policy Attention on the Prime Movers 
of Increasing Food and Agricultural Production
Because of favorable rainfall throughout most of Africa in 1985-87, 
the short-term food outlook for Africa is good. In fact, 12 African coun 
tries had grain surpluses in 1987. However, because of rapid popula 
tion growth, Africa faces a major agricultural production challenge. 
Food supplies will have to be doubled every 17 to 25 years to keep 
up with rapid population growth. The agricultural sector of African na 
tions will also have to generate jobs, new income streams for rural people 
and foreign exchange to enable national economies to import capital 
goods such as tractors, construction material, and mining equipment. 
However, African heads of state are being inundated with fragmented 
advice from Western donors and their advisors on how to increase and 
sustain annual food production growth rates of 3 to 5 percent over the 
next generation.
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Over the past 25 years of working on African development problems, 
I have noted that planning for increasing food and agricultural produc 
tion in Africa is heavily biased by the faddish and narrow views of the 
several dozen major donors, private voluntary agencies and legions of 
Western academic specialists who typically play up the role of a single 
factor of agricultural change such as new technology or pricing policy. 
Many of these academic specialists are zealously promoting the cur 
rent fad of donors or their discipline. For example, many plant breeders 
are understandably preoccupied with a technological fix to Africa's food 
problems and in placing more emphasis on regenerative agriculture. 
Anthropologists are rightly concerned with the cultural barriers to ex 
panded livestock offtake rates. Agricultural economists typically focus 
on one issue such as: credit, land reform or raising farm prices, while 
general economists are concerned with overvalued exchange rates and 
measures to speed market liberalization.
In a world of increasing specialization and a concern for quick fixes, 
there is an urgent need to move beyond single factors of agricultural 
development and focus on what I call the five prime movers of 
agricultural development as a policy package over the long pull. 4 These 
five prime movers of increasing food and agricultural production are:
1. New technology produced by public and private investments in 
agricultural research.
2. Human capital and managerial skills produced by investments in 
schools, training centers, and on-the-job experience.
3. Biological capital investments (e.g., improving livestock herds) 
and physical capital investment in infrastructure such as dams, ir 
rigation, and roads.
4. Improvement in the performance of institutions such as market 
ing, credit and national agricultural research and extension services.
5. Favorable economic policy environment.
A significant characteristic of the first four prime movers is their long 
gestation period (10 to 25 years). For example, experience has shown 
that it takes ten years of research, on the average, to produce a new 
plant variety, and another five to eight years to gain widespread farmer 
adoption. It takes 10 to 15 years of research on the average to develop
136 Eicher
new technology for increasing livestock production. It takes 10 to 15 
years of graduate study and on-the-job training for an agricultural 
research scientist to be productive. Unfortunately this time span is not 
being reflected in African development plans or in Western foreign aid 
programs that too often move from one short-term fad to another.
The second characteristic of the prime movers of agricultural develop 
ment is their complementary nature and the need to develop an integrated 
investment plan for research, extension, training, etc. The payoff to 
investment to produce new food, cash crop and livestock and technology 
will be low unless there is an effective extension service to diffuse the 
new technology. Likewise, the payoff to investing in agricultural ex 
tension services in Africa has generally been low because many national 
agricultural research services have had little to offer to extension agents. 
For example, the decision of African states to hire 50,000 additional 
extension agents over the 1959 to 1980 period was a mistake in my 
judgment because there was little proven food crop technology available 
for the extension agents to extend with a few exceptions, such as corn 
in eastern and southern Africa. For example, although the French started 
research on millet—a crop that does well in low rainfall (300 to 450 
mm)—in Senegal in 1931, there is still no breakthrough in millet research 
in Africa after five decades of research.
Let us now examine what can be done to step up food and agricultural 
production in Africa by concentrating on the five prime movers.
Technology Generation. There is growing support for the proposi 
tion that expanded rural income from multiple sources is a strategic 
variable in addressing the hunger and poverty in Africa. In short, com 
bating hunger is a more complex process than merely increasing food 
production. Hunger can be combated by expanding the production and 
sale of food crops, export crops, livestock, food and income earned 
from rural off farm employment. Agricultural research that generates 
new production technology for food crops, export crops, and livestock, 
can be important sources of income generation for farmers and a means 
for families to produce food or the income to purchase an improved diet. 
There is lack of agreement in the scientific community on the extent 
of the backlog of improved food crop varieties that are "on the shelf' 
waiting for extension agents to diffuse them to farmers. For example,
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Dunstan Spencer, an authority on African agriculture from Sierra Leone 
recently reported that probably less than 2 percent of total sorghum, 
millet and upland rice area in West Africa is sown with cultivars 
(varieties) through modern genetic research (Spencer 1986, p. 224). 
On the other hand, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), of 
the United Nations, recently asserted that in Africa "except in arid and 
semi-arid areas without irrigation, food production can be roughly doubl 
ed with existing technology. Thus, the immediate need is to provide 
adequate supplies of fertilizer, improved seeds, tools. . . ."(FAO 1986, 
p. 61).
I am of the opinion that the FAO and many other agencies have 
overstated the amount of underutilized technology that is on the shelf 
waiting for farmers to adopt. The stock of on-shelf improved, farmer- 
tested food crop technology is limited today in Africa. The few notable 
exceptions include corn in eastern and southern Africa, hybrid sorghum 
in the Sudan, potatoes in Rwanda, cassava in West Africa, and wheat 
for the cool highlands of Ethiopia, Kenya, northern Tanzania and in 
Zimbabwe where it can be grown in the cool winter months (May- 
September) under irrigation. There is a growing realization that many 
of the national research services in Africa do not have the scientific 
capacity to borrow, screen, test and adapt agricultural technology from 
neighboring countries, regional institutes, the International Agricultural 
Research Centers (lARCs) and the global research system.
The strategic importance of an efficient national agricultural research 
capacity to develop new crop and livestock technology is illustrated by 
Zimbabwe's overflowing grain silos. Currently, Zimbabwe has corn 
in storage equivalent to two years of normal domestic consumption. 
Corn contributes about 50 percent of the calories in the average diet 
in Zimbabwe and it is the staple food in diets in most eastern and southern 
Africa. Zimbabwe's corn revolution is of special interest to African 
countries because the production of corn by small farmers (smallholders) 
tripled from independence in 1980 to 1986. The highlights of Zim 
babwe's corn revolution are as follows:
• Zimbabwe's corn revolution has its origins in research on hybrid 
varieties that was launched in Zimbabwe (formerly Southern
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Rhodesia) in the 1930s. Zimbabwe became the first country after 
the U.S. to introduce hybrid corn in 1950 after carrying out local 
research from 1932 to 1950. Subsequent research in the 1950s 
led to the development of a high yielding hybrid variety (SR-52) 
that was released in 1960 to commercial (large scale) farmers. The 
28 years of local research (1932 to 1960) to develop the famous 
SR-52 hybrid corn variety (the Green Revolution crop of Southern 
Africa) makes a mockery of the three to five year agricultural 
research projects that are being currently peddled by foreign donors 
(Eicher 1984).
• Research from 1960 to 1975 developed shorter season varieties 
for small farmers in low rainfall areas. At independence in 1980, 
Zimbabwe had a backlog of corn varieties ready for delivery to 
small farmers. Today, 100 percent of the commercial farmers and 
roughly 85 percent of the small farmers use hybrid corn varieties, 
the highest of any African country (Rohrbach 1987).
• Public investments in roads, credit, extension and supporting ser 
vices facilitated the expansion of hybrid maize production by 
smallholders from 1980 to 1986.
• Corn prices to farmers were raised from 1980 to 1986 but the 
inflation-adjusted prices have fallen since 1984. Hence, maize pric 
ing policy by itself does not shed much light on Zimbabwe's maize 
revolution.
The message that emerges from Zimbabwe's corn revolution is that 
no single prime mover such as favorable corn prices was responsible 
for tripling of production by smallholders over the past six years. Zim 
babwe concentrated on the five prime movers as a policy package over 
a period of decades and developed the preconditions for the "takeoff' 
in maize production starting at independence in 1980. This is the cen 
tral finding that emerges from Zimbabwe's corn revolution—a message 
that is important for other African states, the U.S. Congress and foreign 
aid donors.
Human Capital and Managerial Skills. I have already commented 
on the great uncertainty on how to strengthen human capital in Africa. 
A major challenge facing educators and professional agriculturalists in
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African and donor agencies is figuring out how foreign assistance can 
most effectively assist in strengthening Africa's indigenous scientific, 
technical and managerial capacity in food and agriculture. Starting with 
great confidence in the 1960s, the major donors and the U.S. founda 
tions have retreated from investment in human capital in the 1970s and 
1980s. For example, the World Bank only extended two educational 
loans to Africa in 1984.
Rural Capital Formation. Agricultural development in industrial coun 
tries has been fueled by the mobilization of family labor for clearing 
land, picking stones and building fences, an accretionary type of capital 
formation whereby family labor improves land productivity and the pro 
ductivity of livestock herds over generations. Security of tenure plays 
a strategic role in converting family labor into capital formation because, 
with security, farmers can be assured that farm improvements can be 
passed on to the next generation. Unfortunately, in Africa there is a 
tendency for donors and private voluntary agencies to dole out subsidized 
credit instead of pressuring African governments to raise interest rates 
in post office savings banks, rural credit banks, etc., in order that farmers 
will have some incentive to save and finance their own farm im 
provements. There is a need for African planning to develop policies 
and institutions for African farm families to finance their own farm in 
vestments as the primary source of rural capital formation.
Rural Institutions. The fourth prime mover is strengthening the per 
formance of rural institutions ranging from farmer irrigation associa 
tions to fertilizer, credit and seed companies. But there is a paucity of 
proven strategies on how to strengthen rural institutions such as 
national agricultural research, credit and extension services. Gunnar 
Myrdal, the Nobel Laureate in Economics from Sweden, recently 
observed that unfortunately most "ordinary" economists assume away 
institutions in their studies of Third World development (Myrdal 1984).
Favorable Economic Policy Environment. The fifth prime mover— 
favorable economic policy environment—is crucially important in 
facilitating the implementation of the first four prime movers. Currently 
in Africa, the major donors—led by the IMF and the World Bank—are 
pressing African states for policy reforms in exchange for additional
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loans and grants. But there are few solid guidelines on the difficult art 
of restructuring institutions such as phasing out or abolishing govern 
ment grain boards, abolishing fertilizer subsidies and increasing the role 
of private traders in delivering farm inputs and in marketing farm pro 
ducts. In Zambia, President Kaunda's regime came close to being toppled 
in November of 1986 when 15 people were killed in food riots follow 
ing the government's decision to double the retail price of cornmeal— 
the staple food of the country—on the advice of the IMF and several 
influential western donors.
In summary, there is a need for African governments and donors to 
focus on the five prime movers of agricultural development as a policy 
package to strengthen the productive capacity of African agriculture 
over the long pull. Food aid can be used to buy time until investment 
in these prime movers pays off. But donors need to come to grips with 
long gestation investments by making an explicit, up-front commitment 
to financing human capital and institution building projects for 10 to 
20 years in Africa, just as they did in Asia in the 1960s and 1970s.
The Challenge of Reducing Poverty 
and Increasing Access to Food
A comparative study of the causes of hunger in the United States, 
India and Zimbabwe would reveal that hunger is not simply caused by 
the insufficiency of national food production, but poverty, unemploy 
ment, landlessness, sickness and other factors. We have questioned In 
dia's motives in sending food aid to Africa when about one-fourth (200 
million) of its population is hungry. Since each of these three countries 
has achieved national food self-sufficiency, one has to look beyond lag 
ging food production as the cause of hunger and food insecurity. Since 
poverty is a major cause of hunger in both rich and poor countries, raising 
per capita incomes is a powerful instrument for helping reduce hunger 
in the long run. But the long run may take 20 to 30 years or longer 
to raise per capita incomes sufficiently to enable people to purchase 
an adequate diet. Therefore, the central policy question is: Do govern-
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ments have an obligation to intervene in the short run to reduce hunger 
in rich and poor countries, including both food deficit and food surplus 
countries?
In the United States it took several decades of political debate before 
a consensus was reached on the need for the federal government to 
finance food stamps to enable the poor, sick, and the unemployed to 
acquire a calorie-adequate diet. Over the past 15 years under both 
Republican and Democratic administrations, the United States has in 
vested $9 to 20 billion per year in food transfer programs. But food 
stamps and other public food transfer programs require careful economic 
analysis in the Third World. This is especially the case in Africa where 
the annual per capita income of one-fourth the countries is below $4003 
and the national economies are strapped to maintain—let alone 
increase—public expenditures on health, education and other basic ser 
vices. For example, in Senegal the per capita income is lower today 
than it was at independence in 1960. In Zambia the average per capita 
income is now almost one-third lower than it was when President Kaunda 
took over from the British at independence (Economist 1987).
In 1987, one-fourth of the African countries (12) had food surpluses 
and three-fourths (33) had food deficits. The challenge in food deficit 
countries is to help increase food production especially among subsistence 
farmers. Increasing food production under conditions of rapid popula 
tion growth requires attention to the prime movers of agricultural 
development over the long pull.
In 1987, 12 African countries had achieved national food self- 
sufficiency and had grain for sale to neighboring countries. But in most 
of these countries, malnutrition is still a major problem because the poor 
lack the means (e.g., jobs, income, and credit) to produce and/or pur 
chase a calorie-adequate diet. There is growing awareness in African 
policy circles and among donors that expanded food production and 
the achievement of national food self-sufficiency will not automatical 
ly end hunger and that poverty must be addressed in a policy package 
to increase food intake among the malnourished.
Fortunately the rhetoric of national food self-sufficiency in many 
African countries is diminishing and more countries are starting to focus
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on both sides of the food security equation—food availability—and in 
creasing access to food by rural and urban households. Today there 
is growing awareness of the need for income and employment generating 
activities (e.g., cash crop production such as cotton and rural small scale 
industries) to help families acquire the means to increase their access 
to food.
The Challenge of Reordering Foreign Aid Priorities
Following the Sahelian drought in the mid-seventies, foreign aid to 
Africa was increased dramatically. For example, foreign aid to the 
Sahelian countries of West Africa increased at a 40 percent compound 
annual rate of growth over the 1971-78 period (Berg 1983, p. 45). To 
day most African countries are receiving two to three times more foreign 
aid on a per capita basis than their counterparts in Asia. Hence, one 
cannot make a blanket case for increasing foreign aid to Africa. In fact, 
in some African countries such as Tanzania, Sudan, Liberia, Senegal 
and Zaire, foreign aid has been a mixed blessing because of misguided 
macroeconomic policies, and low political priority to agriculture. In 
almost all African countries, aid is being delivered by a myriad of donor 
agencies in the form of short-term projects that do little to strengthen 
Africa's basic institutions such as schools, universities and national 
agricultural research services. Careful research would probably reveal 
that Africa has received too much official development assistance— 
especially since 1975—in the form of discrete short-term projects. In 
general, foreign aid has not lived up to its full potential in Africa because 
most donors shift from fad to fad (e.g., integrated rural development 
to basic needs to policy reform) and from subregion to subregion (e.g., 
Sahel to southern Africa).
Since the mid-1980s, most donors have shifted from project to policy- 
based lending under the belief that many of the tens of thousands of 
development projects across Africa (e.g., Kenya had around 1,000 
development projects in all sectors in 1985) are not performing well 
because of adverse macroeconomic policies, excessive state control and
Ending African Hunger 143
subsidies. But there is a basic inconsistency in IMF and World Bank 
appeals to African countries to reduce the level of subsidies in light 
of the heavy role that subsidies play in contributing to food surpluses 
in rich countries such as the United States, Japan and in Western Europe. 
Since there are many recent book length treatments of foreign aid 
(Cassen and Associates 1986) the best one can do here in the limited 
space is to point up the complexity of aid and the difficulty of generalizing 
about the efficiency of aid across 45 countries in Africa. The most im 
portant lesson that donors should learn from the postindependence foreign 
aid experience is that Africa is an agrarian continent today as it was 
at independence in 1960. Donors should put their assistance behind the 
five prime movers of agricultural development over the long pull.
Summing Up
Cutting across the 45 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa is the extraor 
dinary diversity of African people, their cultures, natural resource en 
dowments, stage of development and opportunities for development. 
The more experience one gains in Africa, the more one avoids the facile 
Pan African generalizations such as Africa is a land surplus continent. 
From the past 25 years of Africa's struggle to develop nation-states, 
to forge national identities and to improve the welfare of African peo 
ple, the following generalization flow about food and agriculture.
There is a need to grasp the immensity and diversity of the African 
continent and to seek insights into development problems and solutions 
on a subregional basis such as southern Africa, East Africa, Sahel, Cen 
tral Africa, etc. For example, because of a backlog of proven varieties 
of its staple food—corn—the food outlook in southern Africa is 
reasonably optimistic over the coming five to ten years. On the other 
hand, in semi-arid regions such as the Sahel, the food outlook is 
pessimistic because of the lack of a proven technical package for the 
two staple foods consumed by rural people—sorghum and millet—and 
the lack of proven technology for the two urban crops, rice and wheat.
Rapid population growth will not slow down in the medium term of 
six to ten years. Flooding Africa with contraceptives will not bring about
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a quick reduction in fertility rates. Rapid population growth of 3 to 4 
percent per year requires food supplies to grow at 3 to 5 percent per 
year—an extraordinary difficult task judging from historical experience. 
Despite favorable weather in most of Africa in 1985 and 1986, 
Africa faces an enormous food production challenge until population 
growth rates slow down over the next 10 to 20 years.
There is a need for stepping up investment in scientific training in 
Africa, in reducing the number of fellowships for overseas training, 
and for strengthening Africa's research and teaching institutions over 
a tune span of the next three to four decades.
Expanding food production in and of itself cannot end hunger in Africa. 
Since hunger exists in food surplus nations such as India and the United 
States, it follows that vigorous income and employment generation pro 
grams are critical in helping people increase their access to food. Present 
ly there is little debate on food access in Africa because of the legacy 
of the drought, the preoccupation of Ministries of Agriculture in in 
creasing production and the prevailing view that a food production short 
fall rather than poverty is the main cause of hunger. A vigorous educa 
tional program should be launched to move policy debate beyond food 
self-sufficiency to include both sides of the food security equation- 
food availability through domestic production, storage and trade and 
access to food through home production, employment, purchase in the 
market and food transfers such as food aid.
NOTES
1. Africa will be used in the balance of this chapter to mean Sub-Saharan Africa.
2. A technical package contains two or more components (e.g., new seed, fertilizer) that a 
farmer/herder can adopt to increase crop or livestock production.
3. The total fertility rate in many industrial countries is 1.8 to 2.2.
4. See Eicher (1985) for an expanded discussion of the five prime movers.
5. The World Bank defines a poor country as one with an average per capita income of less than 
$400.
